Consenso “libero” al trattamento sanitario obbligatorio: il paradosso della Corte che (mal) concilia gli opposti – L. Brunetti
Le Institutiones di Giustiniano, riportando una citazione del giurista Fiorentino, definiscono la libertà individuale in questo modo: «libertas quidem est […] naturalis facultas eius quod cuique facere libet, nisi si quid aut vi aut iure prohibetur».
Abstract: The Author, after some introductory considerations on the concepts of “natural freedom” and “juridical obligation”, examines the concept of “free and informed consent” to health treatment, by art. 1 L. n. 219/2017. The concept is analyzed in the light of the constitutional principle of self-determination, pursuant to art. 32 of the Constitution, and of the recent sentence of the Constitutional Court n. 14 of 2023. Regarding to this last ruling, the Author observes how objectionable – on the basis of the acquisitions of deontic logic and legal science – is the conclusion reached by the Judge of Laws, on the compatibility between “mandatory vaccination” and “free consent”, and therefore highly questionable is the constitutionality of the law which, in the presence of a mandatory vaccination, didn’t provide for the exclusion of consent to treatment, precisely because it is not free. The law, however, should have distinguished between the signing of the consent for the information received, and the actual consent, as consent to the health treatment.